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Response
One of the cornerstone principles of American jurisprudence is the
idea that every defendant has a right guaranteed by the United States
Constitution to present his or her defense. Often the defense involves
evidence that may be connected to relatively novel or potentially ques-
tionable scientific theories. Examples of such theories form the basis of
my Comment: viz., polygraph evidence and repressed memory evidence.
Unfortunately, although the defendant deserves the right to present a
defense, courts have often refused to admit polygraph or repressed mem-
ory evidence on the grounds that both are too unreliable and lack
validity.
The history behind the refusal to allow evidence like polygraph and
repressed memory has its basis in the Frye rule. The Frye rule barred
the admissibility of any novel scientific evidence if the proponent of the
evidence failed to convince the court that the technique or theory under-
lying the evidence was generally accepted in the scientific community.
After Federal Rule of Evidence 402 was adopted, the general acceptance
rule was abandoned. Rule 402 states that relevant evidence can only be
excluded if it is required by a provision of the Constitution, a statute, or
a rule of the Supreme Court. Polygraph evidence is obviously relevant,
and so it would therefore appear that such evidence would be admissi-
ble, unless barred by the provisions of Rule 402. Unfortunately, courts
are divided on whether to follow Rule 402, or the precedent of general
acceptance instead.
In response to the confusion, the Supreme Court attempted to
resolve the dilemma in Daubert. There, the Court relaxed the general
acceptance burden of Frye while simultaneously giving trial judges an
additional responsibility, or perhaps a more defined responsibility, to act
as gatekeepers in preventing the admission of unreliable evidence. This,
of course, gave rise to another problem within itself-giving trial judges
a responsibility of making decisions almost blindly, considering the
novel scientific nature that many types of evidence often present.
Using their gatekeeping role, trial judges often exclude polygraph
and refreshed memory evidence because of the questionable reliability
and validity of the techniques and methodologies involved. However,
depending on the party offering the evidence, the extent of exclusion
varies considerably.
With regard to polygraph examinations, the Supreme Court
attempted to shed some light in Scheffer. In Scheffer the Court refused
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to admit polygraph evidence offered by the defendant, stating that the
evidence was too unreliable and unsubstantiated. The Court also noted
that allowing such evidence may create Federal Rule of Evidence 403
problems such as unfair prejudice, issue confusion, misleading the jury,
etc. The majority refused to admit the evidence although the polygraph
results reported that the defendant was being truthful in his denial of the
charges. While the Supreme Court was quite clear in its decision and
rationale, the problem, as I see it, is that Scheffer was a military case and
does not control civilian cases. As a consequence, although Scheffer
provides some guidance, it does not set a clear universal precedent. This
is evidenced through the arbitrary adaptation of the Scheffer holding in
some courts, in some cases, all over the country.
Some judges follow Scheffer and refuse to admit polygraph evi-
dence. Other courts have refused polygraph evidence based on the fact
that there are no universal standards for polygraph procedures and result
interpretation or training examiners. All of these reasons are valid for
not allowing polygraph evidence, but the reasons do not appear to pre-
sent such an insurmountable barrier when the polygraph evidence is
being offered by the prosecution.
Repressed memory evidence has also fallen under the category of
questionable reliability or validity. Repressed memories are those that
are hidden in the sub-conscious in order to protect the mental health of
the individual. Memories that are uncovered, or unhidden, are consid-
ered to be refreshed. There are three main methods of refreshing one's
memory: a memory that is triggered by an event, by hypnosis, or by a
psychiatrist without hypnosis. Although the methodologies differ for
the refreshing techniques, the underlying questions of reliability are con-
sistent in each.
Repressed memories are often the result of having experienced
something traumatic-usually, sexual abuse. The theory of memory
refreshing emerged when sexual abuse cases became commonplace in
American jurisprudence. Courts did not embrace this doctrine readily
because of concerns that there was very little empirical data on the the-
ory that repressed memory recovery, in an unaltered state, is possible.
Further, there is even less data that gives credibility to any method of
memory recovery.
While there have been many decisions explaining the refusal for
each type of recovery technique, the most troublesome of the courts
appears to be the psychiatrically refreshed memory recovery without
hypnosis. This is because there is a very real possibility that the psychi-
atrist, whether intentionally or not, may have altered the memory of the
patient during recovery. Of course this evidence should be excluded
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because the personal knowledge requirement of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 602 would be missing. However, personal knowledge is a jury
issue, not a judge issue, and, therefore, the evidence should not be
excluded on this ground. Then again, because refreshed memory testi-
mony is normally coupled with expert testimony on the theory, exclu-
sion may also be warranted because Federal Rule of Evidence 403
confusion and misleading concerns emerge as with polygraph evidence.
Arguably, using the gatekeeping role, judges should probably exclude
this evidence based mainly on the lack of reliability and validity of the
theory itself.
Even though options remain available to judges to exclude
repressed memory testimony, several courts have allowed the testimony
in spite of the problems stated earlier. Unlike that of polygraph evi-
dence, there is not an apparent trend in decisions regarding repressed
memory. It appears that the decision to admit the evidence turns on
factors such as the length of time that elapsed between the memory's
creation and the recovery of that memory and the descriptiveness of the
event.
Despite a clear pattern, there are more reported cases where the
defendant's repressed memory evidence is excluded than with the exclu-
sion of pro-prosecution evidence. This may be because of the relatively
few number of cases where the defendant offers such evidence. Ironi-
cally, the Supreme Court in Rock decided to allow such evidence
because there was no other testimonial evidence that could be introduced
for the defendant. This one factor significantly limited the Rock deci-
sion because the court carefully noted that if there had been other evi-
dence available, the trial judge could have excluded the evidence based
on the reliability issues.
After Rock, as before, courts are still divided on the admissibility of
this evidence, and decisions are often unpredictable as a consequence.
This leaves the defense attorney no other choice but to reach for a con-
stitutional ground that would force admission, as was the case in Rock.
Incidentally, this was how most of the defense attorneys were successful
in having the evidence admitted.
Both polygraph evidence and repressed memory evidence present
problems because of their questionable reliability. Even so, there are
rules that bar the admittance of evidence where the fact-finder could be
led, or misled, to reach the wrong conclusion. While I agree with the
reasons for exclusion of both types of evidence, this exclusion should be
universal and not arbitrarily applied. I fail to see how the rigid bounda-
ries of admitted evidence become more flexible when the prosecution or
plaintiff offers it.
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Unfortunately, until a controlling precedent is decided, defendants
will continue to be treated differently from plaintiffs and prosecutors to
their peril. In a country where our symbol of justice is blindfolded so
that only the truth will result, these inconsistencies are in direct contra-
diction and must be corrected. That is, if it is truly justice that we seek.
YVETTE J. BESSENT
